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ABSTRACT: We explore prospects for practice-based approaches to logical theory, in particular the link 
between classical and intuitionistic logic and the inferential structure of traditional practices of representation & 
argument in science and mathematics. After discussing some key notions about practice, we outline the 
connection between representation practices and classical logic, and then consider a spectrum of actual practices 
followed or proposed by (real) scientists. Intuitionistic logic helps to clarify the potential of practice-based 
approaches for understanding pluralism, and to hammer some key points about the general thesis.   
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1.  I recently heard a famous logician and philosopher say that “mathematical practice” seems 
to be today’s “holy cow” among certain people. Orientation towards practice-based 
philosophy of science, of mathematics, of logic, has been a powerful trend in the last few decades. 
And, at the very least as complement to previous trends, it ought to be welcomed.  
 
2. Readers are likely to be acquainted with the state of academic affairs in relation to logic, and 
thus to know that the variety of approaches and systems proposed in the field of logic is immensely 
broader than in mathematics. Just to give an example: a survey of current views about what might 
be called “basic logic” provides us with many alternatives – traditionalists will still propose first-
order logic; more open minded people shall suggest classical logic enriched by modal operators; 
more radically, an influential group will say IF logic (Hintikka, Sandu); another will insist on 
epistemic logic (van Benthem). 
This would have been extraordinarily surprising for the generation of Frege and Russell, 
who thought of logic as The One True Logic, and believed it was more solid and strict than 
mathematics itself.  How do we account for that phenomenon? 
*  This work was supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad, Secretaría de 
Estado de Investigación, under project FFI2009-10024. 
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It can be understood by placing logic in the context of its associated practices: unicity 
emerged from systematisation and formalisation of the inferential skeleton of a traditional body of 
argumentation practices in science and mathematics. It is coherent to think their unicity inherited 
the homogeneity of a body of practices, far from being a priori. Later, when left to itself and to 
form associations with all kinds of different practices – linguistic, philosophical, computational, etc. 
–, logic has shown to be highly underdetermined (at least, much more than math). 
 
3.  What is a practice-based approach? Simply put: The attempt to ground logical theory on 
practices of logical inference; e.g. the attempt to solve the vexing problem of the logical constants 
by arguing from the character of certain (extra-logical) practices and the features of inference and 
valid argument within them. This means that one argues for the cogency or even necessity of logical 
features from the problems and goals set for the practice, and considers those logical features as 
aspects of the proper methodology of the practice.  
 The main idea in the sequel is simply that classical logic models the inferential structure of 
traditional practices of representation (and argument) in science and mathematics. I shall speak of 
mathematico-scientific practices of representation, or even (for brevity) math-scientific practices. 
But before coming to the details, some preliminaries seems required. 
 
4. It seems necessary to ask twofold: What is a practice? And, how can normative elements 
emerge from experience within a practice? Here are preliminary answers: 
1. A practice can only be discernible – can only exist – when it has an accepted topic and 
problems (consider e.g. practices of navigation in the Mediterranean by coasting, or in Micronesia 
by stars, winds, birds;1
2. With an established practice come accepted solutions (examples: to draw a right angle, 
employ a triangle of sides 3, 4, 5; memorize stars and their positions relative to islands, think of the 
ship as static and the islands moving towards you).  
 consider the practice of solving practical construction problems in the 
plane).  
3. This means that, explicitly of implicitly, conditions of success for problems have been 
developed.  That naturally leads to criteria for success being established, methods being laid out and 
taught.  
4. The initial ingredients for the articulation of normative elements in the practice have been 
laid. Subsequently may come systematisation, etc., including articulation of criteria as explicit 
1  This famous example of old Micronesian navigation was studied in (Hutchins 1995). 
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norms.  
Note: More than ‘normative’, perhaps it is reasonable to see logic as being regulatory. 
 
5.  Attempts to ground logical theory on practices of logical inference (elsewhere) are not very 
novel. Corcoran in (Corcoran 1973) proposed to understand classical logic as a mathematical model 
of the inferential structures present “in the practice” of classical mathematics. What may be novel is 
the meaning we assign to the expression “mathematical practice”, the extent to which we mean an 
idealized form of practice (textbook kind) or else we mean to consider the spectrum of actual 
practices followed or proposed by (real) research mathematicians. 
 The difference can be crucial, as the case of Corcoran exemplifies. He has a highly specific 
notion of what mathematical practice is, and his notion is heavily idealized; to put it simply, his 
math-practice is rigid and also Platonistic. It is easy to show contrary evidence: one can e. g. point 
to work by individual mathematicians of the first rank that cannot be squared with Corcoran’s 
notion (even if we avoid Brouwer or Martin-Löf, we may consider H. Weyl, W. Lawvere, or T. 
Gowers). In actual fact, by the mid-20th
 My “mathematical practices” is in the plural, it is not a logician’s idealized notion but a 
historically rich one; it is not rigid but flexible, hence plural. 
 cent. “mathematical practice” was an expression employed 
by intuitionists and constructivists above all.  
 
6.  Since my notion of mathematical practice is not rigid, but flexible, it is a problem to explain 
the incredibly high level of constraint present in mathematical practice as historically given. The 
mathematics developed by 95% of experts in the last 200 years (notice however the rest 5% 
includes some of the Abel prizes) can be understood, with some simplification perhaps, to work on 
the basis of tertium exclusum and reductio ad absurdum; to be satisfactorily modelled (except 
perhaps for some traits that one can ignore in good approximation) in deductive reconstructions 
within the frame of first-order logic; to assume that there is one single structure of the real numbers 
(an intended model), which in turn can easily be interpreted to rest on mathematical Platonism.2
 Why has that been so? Why such a level of communality? Perhaps it is because the real 
development of mathematics is an in-time, imperfect expression of ideal mathematics, of Platonic 
structures that we approximate more and more as we correct methods and results. This is a beautiful 
perspective that reminds me not only of Gödel, also of French philosopher Lautman, but I find it too 
difficult to let it go, to be convinced. 
 
2  Even the celebrated proof of Fermat’s last theorem by Wiles, using heavy machinery of algebraic geometry, 
etc., has been shown to be reducible to axiomatic set theory with minor augmentations; see (McLarty 2010). 
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There is an alternative: if we forget the 20th century ideology of mathematics for its own 
sake, math understood as a wholly autonomous discipline,3
 
 we can bring into the picture the 
connections between math and physics (let’s simplify and forget other disciplines). The argument, 
presented aphoristically, would be that classical logic is the logic (i.e., the mathematical model of 
inference structures) of mathematico-scientific representation of phenomena. 
7.  At a certain level, whose exact boundaries may be difficult to establish, the practices of 
math-scientific representation share a lot with less specialized practices of representation (like 
representation of everyday events in the context of legal/practical debates and decisions, or 
practices of the kind developed by pre-Socratic philosophers). This helps explain how it is possible 
that Greek authors had already captured the essentials of propositional logic (the Stoics). 
  At a different level, I believe it is essential for conceptual and historical analysis to insist on 
the differences between Aristotelian (or traditional) logic and the logic of quantifiers. In particular, 
common representation practices, and even philosophical practices of argument, did not lead to a 
rich logic of relations and quantifiers. This came from math-scientific practices, and particularly 
from pure mathematics. De Morgan, around 1860, said: “the algebraist was living in the higher 
atmosphere of syllogism, the unceasing composition of relations, before it was admitted that such 
an atmosphere existed.” (De Morgan 1966, 241) It was in algebra, he felt, that the general idea of 
relation emerged, and it was there that “the notions of relation and relation of relation” were first 
symbolized.  
 
8.  How do we get to classical logic from practices of representation? The argument in outline 
would go this way (please take the sequel as a mere sketch).  
Consider negation: it seems plausible that all practices of representation, from the common 
(e.g. involved in navigation or hunting) to the scientific ones (astronomy or geodesy, to name only 
Ancient sciences), will involve linguistic markers for negation. The relation between proposed 
models and actually given events (e.g. position of capes in a map vs. actual experience of the capes; 
orbits of planets vs. their measured positions) will be one of concordance or discordance. This, of 
course, could and ought to be studied historically, but the goal of representing by means of certain 
(linguistic or graphic or mental…) representations will make it necessary to speak about failures of 
representation.  
However, it seems plausible too that the math-scientific heritage of interest to us has 
3  Perhaps not easy to do, but timely. See for instance the paper: Le retour de Fourier, by J. P. Kahane (2005). 
URL = http://www.academie-sciences.fr/activite/archive/dossiers/Fourier/Fourier_pdf/Fourier_Kahane.pdf 
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depended crucially on this: that proposed representations have been subjected to explicit discursive 
criticism (but if things are so-and-so, then… and this is not correct, hence…). We need practices of 
argumentation, in fact, to have negation inferentially employed in forms like those analysed and 
systematised by logicians, like those employed by classical scientists and mathematicians. The 
connection between modus tollens and scientific method is too well known to deserve more than a 
mention. 
Take e.g. the Stoics: with practices of representation and argumentation come “assertibles 
(axiômata)”, that is to say declarative sentences with a truth-value – at any one time they are either 
true or false, tertium exclusum.4
 
 And then we have basic inferential schemes like the “five 
indemonstrables” (modus ponens, modus tollens, hypothetical judgement, etc.), and basic inference 
rules like the “four themata”. Thus it seems that one can reconstruct the emergence of bivalent 
classical logic (propositional level) from representation-and-argument practices such as those 
involved in astronomy or geodesy.  
9.  It is an interesting historical project to substantiate this concretely; and it seems not only 
interesting, but also crucial, to inquire the extent to which realistic assumptions (of the kind 
proposed by Plato, Kepler, Gauss) have been influential on the path to these inferential features of 
the argument practices.  
I consider this to be an open question. But notice the issue of realism (or Platonism) is 
linked with the representation aspect, not primarily with the argumentation. We come back to the 
topic in connection with intuitionism. 
 
10. I think it will be useful to bring intuitionistic logic (IL) into the discussion. As you all know, 
intuitionistic propositional logic can be described as classical logic without the Aristotelian law of 
excluded middle: (p ∨ ¬p), but with the law of contradiction (¬p → (p → q)). In this system, 
double negation does not imply the truth of the proposition: (¬¬p → p
Very often, IL is presented as a system codifying the consequence relation in a language that 
assigns different meanings to the connectives. The new meaning is understood as directly linked, 
not to truth simpliciter, but to actual proof or to actual verification. (
) is not generally valid; 
reductio ad absurdum is rejected.  
p ∨ ¬p) would state that either 
p has been proved or it has been refuted; hence it’s easy to see why it fails. (p → q
4  See e.g. (Bobzien 2008) in the Stanford Enc. of Phil. 
) would say that 
we posses a rule for transforming any proof of p into one of q. 
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For my purposes, it is important to make clear that this account, although useful for teaching 
IL (and historically linked with expositions by Heyting), methodologically and philosophically 
distorts the situation. The intuitionistic laws are directly linked with truth and falsity. As R. Cook 
has argued in detail (see his chapter in Shapiro 2006), one cannot interpret the intuitionist as talking 
about different connectives. 
 
11. What is then the ground for such a strong difference? I will concentrate on the path followed 
by Brouwer and Weyl, and it is crucial to pay attention not just to what they proposed, but also to 
what they rejected – and why. Let us assume, for simplicity of the argument, that Brouwer –like 
Weyl in 1918, or like he himself up to 1912– has no qualms with natural-number arithmetic. If all 
there was in math were the natural and real numbers, finite or denumerable structures, and the like, 
there would be no need for changing logic. But mathematics deals with infinite structures going 
beyond the denumerable: the structure of real numbers is as central to the enterprise as the naturals.  
 Now, Brouwer and Weyl reject the usual reconstructions of the structure of real numbers 
(Dedekind, Cantor, Hilbert) because of their realistic assumptions (Platonism). One cannot treat R 
as a fully determined totality: it’s individual elements are not fully determined ‘in themselves’, for 
each one of them is an actually infinite system; they are only determined insofar as the 
mathematician is in a position to offer explicit determinations, which perhaps can be done in 
denumerably many cases; a fortiori, the “set of all” real numbers cannot be treated as a fully 
determinate mathematical object – to the indeterminacy of individual reals one must add the fact 
that, apparently, non-denumerably many of them shall remain indeterminate. 
 
12. The failure of some classical logical laws is a consequence, not of a change in the meaning 
of the connectives, but of realizing the peculiar methodological and (one might add) metaphysical 
conditions affecting higher mathematics. There is no continuity between finite structures and higher 
math, no continuity between representations of real world phenomena and higher math, due to the 
very peculiar, indeterminate nature of what is usually called “the objects” of higher mathematics. 
 
13.  The critic could now say, But the structure of real numbers merely represents the structure 
of time and of geometric lines! And so many physical theories, from mechanics and 
electromagnetism to relativity and even quantum physics, have verified empirically the adequacy of 
such representations! Take for instance QED, which is the most successfully corroborated theory in 
the whole history of science. 
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 The simple answer is that all of these empirical arguments are insufficient to establish the 
realistic character of the continuum involved in usual physics. In order to jump to the conclusion 
that the real number system is fully determinate, we should adopt a fully realistic stance regarding 
the continuum as a means to represent physical phenomena. Neither all physicists (e.g. Heisenberg, 
Penrose) nor all mathematicians, nor all philosophers adopt such a stance. Again, there is the option 
of regarding the continuum (via time or space) as given in intuition, and again this is quite 
controversial. And, shouldn’t logic be a neutral system, independent of such strongly contentious 
questions? 
 In the case of Brouwer, precisely it was his intention, from the beginning, to develop pure 
mathematics as an intellectual system, completely independent from applied math or physics. For a 
number of reasons, some of them strongly philosophical, he wanted mathematics to remain free 
from any ‘contamination’ from the goals and biases of science and technology.5
 
 I know this kind of 
proposal is normally disregarded with little or no argument, simply because it is so uncommon. 
Funny that those who so disregard it will immediately present themselves as advocates of pure 
mathematics! 
14.  The whole story of intuitionism and intuitionistic logic, that I have presented too quickly 
here, should do the job of emphasizing some of the key points. The difference between classical and 
intuitionistic is not a simple question of change of topic: whatever nuanced change of meaning one 
may find, its source lies in complex methodological and metaphysical issues. Moreover, it should 
have become clear that classical logic is intimately tied to math-scientific representation understood 
in the realistic way that has been characteristic of our tradition (meant is the mainstream scientific 
tradition, from the Greeks all the way until Einstein and present-day theoretical physicists)6
 The philosopher of logic does not need to solve all of the vexing problems we have 
discussed, but in my view he or she should be highly conscious of them. At the very least, one 
ought to accept that intuitionistic mathematics is a highly relevant theoretical practice based on one 
sound way of approaching the constellation of problems surrounding the continuum (one among 
several ways, classical Dedekind-Hilbert approaches included). Thus a practice-based approach to 
the philosophy of logic is congenial to pluralism, but it should also serve to enhance our awareness 
of the presuppositions behind different logical systems. By doing this, I hope, we shall be 
. 
5  For details, see the excellent biography (van Dalen 2005). Brouwer’s early book Life, Art, and Mysticism 
(1905) is highly relevant for the topic. 
6  Notice than even Kantians, for all the sophistication of their standpoint, leave unaltered the realistic 
interpretation, now regarding the “phenomenal world” (not the “things in themselves”). 
Proceedings of the VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science 
Actas del VII Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España
658
contributing to better understanding of what logic is, and what it can be. 
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